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PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL PARASTATALS IN KENYA: 1964 - 1984 
ABSTRACT 
The paper analyses the performance o f four parastatal financial institutions, 
including the KCB, NBK, HFCK and AFC. Performance i s analysed in terms of 
the four potent ia l b e n e f i c i a r y groups: deposi tors , borrowers, stockholders 
and employees. I t i s shown that the depository financial parastatals played 
an important r o l e in the development o f the Kenyan financial sector. They 
performed e f f i c i e n t l y enough to compete successful ly with the private sector, 
while remaining highly p r o f i t a b l e . S ince 1979 the i r performance relative 
to the private sec tor has suffered as they have been used to extend banking 
services into more remote rura l areas . The posi t ive performance of the 
depository i n s t i t u t i o n s cont ras t s sharply with that of the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation. The AFC i s shown to be i n e f f i c i e n t , unprofitable and 
to serve mainly to t r a n s f e r s t a t e funds to i t s rather e l i t e c l ientele . 
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University of Sussex 
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This paper evaluates the performance of parastatals in the 
financial sector. It is organised in two parts. The first half 
of the paper covers depository institutions and the last part 
covers a non-depository financial firm, the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation. 
The first part of the paper covers those firms which accept 
deposits from the public which they then loan out. The 
depository institutions include both commercial banks (CB) and 
I ; ' • • 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFI), The distinction will be 
important in assessing the performance of the parastatal firms. 
The period under study is 1971-84. Performance is shown to 
differ between the early part of the period and the later part, 
with the break occurring around 1979. The first section will be 
structured as follows. First will come background information on 
the growth patterns of the financial sector. Second will come an 
account of the entry of the Kenya government into direct 
participation in the sector. Third will come an analysis of the 
performance of the parastatal firms relative to the performance 
of the financial sector as a whole. 
" . I •' 1 1 V I 
It will be shown that the depository financial institutions 
have functioned effectively, competing successfully with private 
firms and earning consistent high profits. During the seventies 
they pioneered in the development of general purpose NBFIs, which 
has contributed importantly to the development of financial 
2 
intermediation in Kenya. During recent years they have been used 
for more distributional goals, spreading financial intermediation 
to rural areas, with no apparent drop in efficiency. 
The second section will provide stark contrast. It will 
analyze the activities of the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(AFC) from 1963-83. It will show that this firm has been highly 
politicised and is commercially non-viable. It will be shown to 
be unprofitable and inefficient; mainly functioning to transfer 
funds to its clients, who are an elite group. The AFC has 
largely failed in its role of mobilising credit to the 
agricultural sector, a role which has been increasingly filled by 
the depository firms. 
Performance is analysed in terms of the four groups who are 
potential beneficiaries of the parastatals: depositor, borrowers, 
stockholders and employees. Data relating to each will be 
presented. 
I, DEPOSITORY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
i 
A. GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
Depository institutions are regulated under the Central Bank 
of Kenya Act, 1966 and the Banking Act of 1968, Regulations 
t. 
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differ between commercial banks (CBs) and non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFIs). However, within those categories the 
regulations apply uniformly to institutions which are owned by 
government, by foreign banks or by private citizens. 
Commercial banks (CBs) accept deposits in the form of 
checking accounts, savings accounts and time deposits. They are 
not permitted to pay interest on checking deposits. Minimum, 
interest rates are set by the Central Bank for the latter types 
of deposits. Commercial banks make loans, subject to maximum 
interest rates set by the Central Bank. Other charges, such as 
application fees and commitment fees are also limited by the 
Central Bank. 
Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) also accept deposits 
and make loans. They are not permitted to offer checking 
accounts. Minimum interest rates paid on savings accounts and 
time deposits are also set by the Central Bank, at rates higher 
than those for commercial banks. Maximum interest rates charged 
on loans are also set by the Central Bank, also at rates higher 
than those allowed for commercial banks > Other charges , such as 
application fees and commitment fees are not regulated, and can 
be quite significant, Paulson reported that, while the maximum 
interest rate on NBFI loans in mid-1983 was 16%, the effective 
rate reported on some NBFI loans exceeded 30%.
 1
 Commercial banks 
1
 Paulson, 1984, page 74. 
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have been restricted, in lending for consumer durables and real 
estate.
 2 
The differential interest rate regulations have thus favored 
the growth of NBFIs over CBs. The NBFI can charge more for 
loans, which makes them more profitable. Because they can charge 
more for loans, they can afford to pay more to attract deposits, 
which they are allowed to do. Thus depositors are attracted to 
put their money in NBFIs rather than CBs. 
One other aspect of the financial market should not escape 
notice. That is the tendency for CBs and NBFIs to operate as 
pairs. This can and does happen from either direction: some 
banks have found it. profitable to start NBFI subsidiaries, while 
some NBFIs have found it profitable to start CB subsidiaries. 
The latter was ruled out by the recent ( 1985) revision of the 
Banking Act. The incentive for banks to create NBFIs is clear: 
they can steer loan applications to the NBFI and make more money 
on the loan. The incentive for NBFIs to start banks derives from 
the structure of the reserve requirement. NBFIs do not have 
accounts with the Central Bank; instead they may count as liquid 
reserves current account deposits held with commercial banks, 
cash and Treasury Bills. The reserve requirement for NBFIs has 
ranged from 15 to 24% from 1974-1983. Since NBFIs receive no 
interest on the current account deposits they are forced to keep 
z Paulson, 1984, page 62. 
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with banks, they can profit by placing them in banks they own, 
which can make loans against them. 
The growth in deposits in both CBs and NBFIs is shown in 
Table 1. The growth was much faster prior to the coffee boom 
than after. For purposes of discussion we will distinguish the 
fast growth period as 1971-79 and the slow growth period as 1979-
84. 
At the beginning of the period, in .1971, deposits .in NBFIs 
were only 14% of deposits in commercial banks, Commercial bank 
deposits were growing rapidly, 20% p. a., compared with inflation 
of 10.5%. Deposits in NBFIs were growing even more rapidly, 
30,6% p.a. After the coffee boom deposit growth slowed. Overall 
deposit growth slowed from 21.7% p. a. to 14.5% p. a. But this 
fall in deposit growth was very unequally distributed. 
Commercial bank deposit growth dropped most dramatically, from 
20.0% p.a. in 1971-79 to 10.1% p.a. in 1979-84. J.n other words 
CB deposits barely kept pace with inflation after the coffee 
boom. 
Meanwhile, NBFI deposit growth dropped much less, from 30,6% 
P. a. in 1971-79 to 26.6% p. a. from 1979-84. Since NBFI deposits 
grew faster than CB deposits throughout the p e r i o d , they 
naturally increased their market share. Whereas in 1971 NBFI 
6 IDS/WP 449 
TABLE 1. GROWTH IN DEPOSITS IN CBs AND NBFIs 
(millions of current shillings) 
YEAR CB depoi 5 X % S NBFI depQs its Tot^l 
1971 3, 186 .72 442 . 14 3,628. 86 
1972 3,545, .3 582 .92 4, 128. 9 0 £.t 
1973 4,559, . 12 677 . 01 5,236. 13 
1974 5,840, , 18 817 .26 6,657. 44 
1975 7,157, . 12 1.254 .06 8,411. 18 
1976 10,506, , 8 1,429 .56 11,936. 36 
1977 12,130 .48 2, 106 .93 14,237. 41 
1978 12,597, ,48 2,827 .96 15,425, 44 
1979 13,711, .5 3,733 . 19 17,444. 69 
1980 14.002, , 16 4,852 .51 18,854. 67 
1981 15,685. ,98 5,691 .6 21,377. 58 
1982 18,392, .24 7,176 .41 25,568. 65 
1983 19,449, ,76 8,671 .91 28,121, 67 
1984 22,159, , 4 12,153 .9 34,313. 3 
GROWTH RATES, % 
PERIOD CB. DEP NBFI TOTAL PRICES 
71-79 20. 0 30.6 21.7 10.5 
79-84 10. 1 2 6 . 6 14. 5 9.9 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya., Economic and F i n a n c i a l R e v i e w , 
various years. 
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deposits were only 14% of CB deposits, by 1979 they were 27.2% 
and by 1984 they were 54.8% as large as CB deposits. 
While NBFIs have been considered a significant phenomenon 
and attracted a great deal of attention since the late 1970s, 
this is slightly misleading. NBFIs were growing dramatically 
throughout the 70s as well as since then. But their dramatic 
gain over CBs is due to a sharp decrease in growth of CB deposits 
since that time rather than to increasing growth of NBFI 
deposits. 
Interest rates have been set administratively at levels 
which are below market clearing rates, and also, throughout the 
seventies, below inflation. In the face of excess demand for 
loans, the Central Bank has issued guidelines to banks which have 
attempted to influence the allocation of available funds. These 
guidelines have encouraged lending to agriculture and discouraged 
lending for luxury consumption.
3
 Loans to foreigners are also 
restricted.
4 
Beginning with the Budget of 1980, interest rates have been 
adjusted upward several times.
5
 Table 2 shows that positive real 
3
 Central Bank of Kenya, page 20. 
4
 Swainson, page 189. 
5
 Paulson, page 74. 
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TABLE 2 NOMINAL AND REAL INTEREST FATES 
INTEREST RATE 
(Commercial banks, INFLATION 
9-12 month time dep.) RATE 
REAL 
INTEREST 
RATE 
1968 4 . 0 1 .8 
1969 4 . 0 1 .0 
1970 4 . 0 2 .7 
1971 4, .0 4 .9 
1972 4, . 0 7 , .7 
1973 4, , 0 9, ,3 
1974 5 , 6 18 , 0 
1975 5. ,6 10 , .4 
1976 5. ,6 16, 3 
1977 5. 6 18 , 0 
1978 5 . 6 3 . 3 
1979 5. 6 5 . 1 
1980 6. 4 8. 7 
1981 12. 3 9. 2 
1982 13. 8 10. 7 
1983 13. 0 10. 4 
1984 12. 0 10. 3 
2.2 
3.0 
1.3 
-0.9 
-3.7 
-5.3 
-12.4 
-4.8 
- 1 0 , 
12, 
2, 
0, 
, 6 
,4 
,3 
,5 
3 
1 
1 
. 6 
7 
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rates were achieved throughout the eighties. As interest rates 
have risen this greater differential between real rates of return 
on interest bearing and non-interest bearing deposits has helped 
fuel the large shift of deposits from commercial banks to non-
bank financial institutions. Unfortunately, no time series on 
deposit rates for NBFI are available, but their rates have 
exceeded those paid by CB's.
6
 In addition to paying higher 
interest rates, it is widely reported that NBFI engage in non-
interest rate competition for deposits by offering cash payments 
and preferential treatment to large depositors.
7 
McKinnon suggests that high interest rates contribute 
positively to economic development by permitting greater 
intermediation. When firms and households are not constrained to 
self-finance, funds should flow to higher return investments, 
increasing the average quality of investment and raising the rate 
of economic growth. 
During the years since the establishment of the Central Bank 
and since government began direct participation in the financial 
sector, substantial development of the financial structure has 
been achieved. Figure 1 shows that the public has grown 
increasingly willing to hold money in the form of deposits, 
Paulson, page 75. 
Paulson, page 65. 
10 * IDS/WP 449 
Fig 1, Public's W i l l i n g n e s s t o H o l d D e p o s i t s 
v 
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instead of as currency. Figure 2 shows that the ratio of money 
to GDP grew substantially in the period 1968-79. Figure 2 also 
shows that most of this growth was in time and savings deposits, 
included in M2, while the ratio of Ml (currency plus demand 
deposits in commercial banks) to GDP did not change 
substantially. 
Although the number of banks operating in Kenya has grown, 
the sector is still quite concentrated, especially outside of 
Nairobi and Mombasa. Table 3 shows the distribution of bank 
branches as of 30 June, 1983. It shows that of 161 bank branches 
in Kenya, 123 belonged to one of the four large retail banks, 
Kenya Commercial Bank, Barclays,. Standard, or National Bank of 
Kenya. Of the '87 bank branches located outside Nairobi and 
Mombasa, 78 belonged to one of these 4 large banks. Of these 
four banks, th«fe National Bank of Kenya is in. a distant 4th place. 
It had only 8 full branches, compared with Kenya Commercial 
Bank's 49, Barclays' 30 and Standard's 36. Thus the retail 
banking sector in Kenya is highly concentrated, with only 4 
significant actors. 
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Fig 2, Ratios of Money to GDP 
M2/C-DP 
Ml/GDP-
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TABLE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF BANK BRANCHES 
(As of 30 June, 1983) 
Area Nairobi Mombasa Other Tote il 
Bank Full Sub Full Sub Full Sub Full Sub 
KCB 10 5 4 2 35 29 49 36 
Barclays 11 4 3 1 16 24 30 29 
Standard 10 - 2 1 24 - 36 1 
NBK 4 1 1 2 • 3 - 8 3 
Cooperative 1 — 1 — 4 - 6 0 
Subtotal 36 10 11 6 82 53 129 69 
Other Banks 17 3 10 9 5 - 32 12 
Total 53 13 21 15 87 53 161 81 
Source: Paulson, 1984, page 54. 
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B. GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
Participation of the Kenyan government in the financial 
sector dates from the late '60s. The primary goal of the 
government in entering the sector was to make the sector more 
responsive to borrowing needs of the Kenyan public. Foreign 
banks had lent very little to Kenyans of African origin, choosing 
instead to invest surplus funds abroad.8 
It was announced at the time that takeover of control of 
commercial banking was not intended "to bring about new thinking 
or practices in commercial banking," and that government owned 
banks were "to operate on commercial principles."
9
 Operating on 
such commercial principles, the newly nationalised Kenya 
Commercial Bank found it possible to expand lending to Kenyans of 
African origin by 225% between January and September, 1971. i
0 
The Kenyan government used a two-fold approach to entering 
the commercial banking field, creation de novo and acquisition of 
existing financial institutions. 
8
 Central Bank of Kenya, page 19. 
9
 J.N. Michuki, chairman of KCE, as quoted in Leys, page 
134. 
1 0
 Quoted in Leys, pag-e 157. 
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In 1965 the government, together with the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation, created the Housing Finance Company of 
Kenya. The HFCK was set up for the purpose of accepting deposits 
from the public which it would then reloan in the form of 
mortgages. The HFCK was set up with a very small initial capital 
base. Its size wa3 boosted considerably in 1970 by the 
acquisition of another NBFI, First Permanent (EA) Ltd. 
In 1968 the government created the National Bank of Kenya, 
The National Bank of Kenya operates an NBFI subsidiary, the Kenya 
National Capital Corporation (known as Kenyac), which was set up 
in 1976. The figures given below represent the consolidation of 
the NBK and its subsidiaries. Figures on the NBK per se are not 
available since 1979. 
In 1970 the government acquired 60% of the shares of the 
National and Grindlay3 Bank, which was then renamed the Kenya 
Commercial Bank. National and Grindlays had operated in Kenya 
since 1904 and. had an extensive branch network. The takeover was 
completed in 1976 when the remaining shares were acquired from 
Grindlays. The takeover was friendly and a contract was signed 
with Grindlays such that they would provide most of the high 
level management, with the proportions declining as Kenyans were 
trained to fill more and more positions. The management and 
training contracts were renewed several times, but finally 
expired in 1986, at which time the last expatriates left. The 
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Kenya Commercial Bank owns an NBFI, the Kenya Commercial 
Financial Corporation Ltd. , which was set up in 1971. 
The financial parastatals have in many ways enjoyed a 
privileged status among parastatals. They have been headed by a 
group of managers generally seen as astute businessmen and 
extremely well connected politically. This group has included 
John Michuki, Stanley Githunguri, Nicholas Nganga, Philip Ndegwa, 
George Saitoti and Benjamin Kipkorir, 
These firms have enjoyed considerable operating autonomy, at 
least autonomy from the normal civil service bureaucratic 
controls, if not political autonomy. For example, while it is 
required that all p&rastatals submit development plans for 
approval and inclusion in the national forward budget, none of 
these firms has done so. Likewise parastatals are required to 
submit investment projects for Treasury approval. Projects which 
can't project financial profitability are generally unlikely to 
receive approval. The banks do not submit their plans for 
expansion of facilities for approval. Given that the Treasury is 
the parent ministry of the depository financial institutions, 
such autonomy is unusual. The KCB produces one of the least 
informative annual reports of any parastatal. KCB justifies its 
secrecy by arguing that fuller disclosure would handicap it in 
competing with the private Barclays and Standard banks, 
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The depository financial parastatals are subject to at least 
3 types of political pressure which they find difficult to 
resist. First, they are pressured by politicians to provide 
loans to politicians and their friends. It is not clear to what 
extent such loans are made against, the better judgement of the 
t 
bankers. It is impressive that once the loans are made, the 
bankers seem to be able to pursue their recovery with full vigor. 
Occasionally even a minister is foreclosed on due to failure to 
pay. The bank staff have learned that so long as the government 
is advised before such stories hit the headlines, they will 
usually be allowed to proceed, or quiet pressure will be put on 
the politician to pay before the matter hits the headlines.
1 1 
Paulson found that only 16% of the accounts had arrears, and all 
those accounts with arrears over 3 months had been turned over to 
lawyers for seizure of security.
1 2 
The second type of political pressure under which the 
parastatal banks find themselves is potentially more serious. 
The parastatal banks are naturally under pressure to act as 
bankers to the rest of the parastatal sector. They have loans to 
many other parastatals, including some of the insolvent ones who 
can't qualify for loans on commercial criteria. Such loans 
always carry government guarantees, but these guarantees are 
often not made good, or only after long delays. The banks have 
i 
1 1
 Interview, KGB staff. 
1 2
 Paulson, 1984, page 187
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been given some leeway in protecting their interests in these 
cases. For example, Kenatco owes money to other (private) 
sources who seemed on the verge of moving against Kenatco. NBK 
was allowed to protect its interests by putting Kenatco under 
receivership. 
Recently a few details of such bad. loans came to light when 
Parliament discussed the guarantees. While the complete numbers 
for all the bad loans were not released, it is clear from the 
numbers which were released that bad loans to other parastatals 
comprise a minimum of 10-15% of the total loan portfolios of KCB 
and NBK.
 1 3
 Clearly if the practice of forcing the parastatals to 
carry bad debts of other parastatals became too widespread, it 
could ruin their effectiveness as banks. 
A third type of political pressure has been concentrated on 
the Kenya Commercial Bank. The KCB has been chosen to help 
decentralise resources outside of the cities by bringing banking 
services to the wananchi. Such a program is expensive, and if 
pushed too far could cause insolvency. This has not occurred. 
Furthermore, it could have been interpreted that since KCB must 
take banking to wananchi that it must extend them loans on less 
than commercial conditions. This also has not happened. It 
appears that KCB is operating in a very business-like way' with 
1
3
 "Kenya's White Elephants: The government continues to 
put good money into failed projects," Financial Review. November 
24, 1986, pages 3-5. 
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proper controls and procedures. It is just that it is opening 
facilities in areas which don't have enough demand to support 
them, using profits from more densely populated areas to 
subsidize them.
1 4
 It seems then, that the autonomous parastatal 
nature of the KCB is being used to circumvent the budget process 
where such inter-regional transfers receive more scrutiny and 
debate. , . . . . . . . ... 
Comparison of the performance of the public and private 
sector banks is hindered by several limitations on data 
availability. Standard Bank's operations in Kenya are carried 
out as part of their international operations and not 
incorporated separately. Thus no figures are available on 
deposits, assets, profitability, etc. on operations in Kenya. 
The same was true for Barclays up until 1979, when it 
incorporated a local subsidiary. However, the Statistical 
Abstract gives data for the commercial banking sector as a whole, 
so we can at least track market shares for the public firms. 
1 4
 Personal interview, KCB staff 
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C. PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL PARASTATALS 
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1. Returns to Depositors 
How well financial parastatals treat their depositors can be 
assessed, by comparing the growth in deposits in parastatals with 
growth in total deposits in all financial institutions, Those 
institutions which increase their market share can be assumed to 
be offering depositors better returns. These returns may be 
monetary, i.e. interest paid, or non-monetary, e.g. convenient 
branch locations, prompt and courteous service, etc. A great 
deal of information on deposits is available and is discussed at 
some length here. Another indirect indicator of returns to 
depositors is the number and location of branches, which will 
also be discussed. 
Comparative Deposit Growth 
The first aspect of performance of the financial parastatals 
to be assessed is their ability to compete for deposits. First 
we will examine the growth in the consolidated (CB plus NBFI) 
parastatals with growth in total (CB plus NBFI) deposits. Then 
we will examine the growth in commercial bank parastatals 
relative to the rest of the commercial bank sector. Next their 
success in attracting non-bank deposits will be compared, with the 
rest of the NBFI sector. 
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Table 4 compares the growth of the public sector firms 
(consolidating the CE's with their NBFI subsidiaries) with total 
growth in deposits. It can be seen that during the early, fast 
growth period, the public firms' deposits grew on a par with 
total deposits. Of the three institutions the HFCK grew at about 
the same rate as total deposits, the NBK grew much faster and the 
KCB grew slightly slower. 
However, during the later, slow growth period the public 
firms experienced a greater slow-down than the industry as a 
whole. Total deposits were growing at 14.5% during 1S79-84, 
while deposits in public financial institutions were growing at 
only 8.8% p.a. Only the HFCK managed deposit growth faster than 
the sector as a whole, while KCB's growth rate was about 2/3 that 
of total deposits and NBK's was only one third. 
It can be seen from Table 5 that during the rapid growth of 
the pre-coffee boom period the National Bank of Kenya grew very 
fast, 34.8% p.a., which was much faster than the growth of 
commercial bank deposits as a whole. On the other hand., deposits 
in the Kenya Commercial Bank grew significantly slower than total 
CB deposits, at a rate of only 13.9% p.a. During the slow growth 
period following the coffee boom, the KCB improved its relative 
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TABLE 4 CONSOLIDATED COMMERCIAL BANK PLUS NBFI DEPOSITS 
(millions of shillings) 
public 
Year KCB NBK* HFCK Total share(%) 
1971 1,108. . 2 
1972 1,189, ,5 
1973 1,568, ,8 
1974 1,768, , 3 
1975 1,849, ,8 
1976 2,251, ,9 
1977 3,297, ,0 
1978 3,796. ,7 
1979 4,033, .3 
1980 4,217. 7 
1981 4,391. , 4 
1982 4,889, ,6 
1983 5,333, , 6 
1984 6,138. 1 
211.8 83.3 
337.5 109.7 
528.0 128.2 
747.1 144,3 
950.3 187.2 
"1,173,6 180.9 
1.461.5 213.6 
1,901.2 246.8 
2,254.7 375,7 
2,323.2 472.6 
2.316.4 688.0 
2,304.0 886.5 
2.446.6 1,020.7 
2.634.5 1,366.3 
3, 628, Q 38 _ 7 
4, 128, .2 39 , 6 
C 
>S \ 236, , 1 42, . 5 
6, 657, .4 40, , 0 
8, 411, O 35, , 5 
11, 936 . , 4 30, 9 
14, 237 , , 4 34. . 9 
15, 425. . 4 38. , 5 
17, 444, 7 • 1 38, .2 
18, 854, , 7 37, ,2 
3 377 , , 6 34, ,6 
25, 568 , ,7 31. ,6 
28, 121, , 7 31. .3 
34, 313, , 3 .30. , 9 
SUMMARY OF GROWTH EPISODES (growth in % p.a.) 
71-79 18.8 34.4 21.6 21.7 21.5 
79-84 8.8 3.2 29.5 14.5 8.8 
* The NBK uses a balance sheet date of June 30, while all other 
firms use December 31. For purposes of comparison, the deposits 
reported here are the linear interpolation of the deposits they 
report 6 months before and 6 months after the end of each year. 
Sources: Annual reports and Central Bank of Kenya, Economic and 
Financial Review, various years. 
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TABLE 5 COMPARISON OF COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS 
(Deposits in millions of current shillings, shares in %) 
KCB SHARE NBK* SHARE BARCLAYS SHARE TOTAL 
1971 1,021, ,3 32, .0 211. 8 6, ,6 3,186. 7 
1972 1,083, ,3 30. .6 337. 5 9 , 5 3,545. 3 
1973 1,438, ,6 34, ,4 528. 0 11, , 6 4,559. 1 
1974 1,580, ,5 27, , 1 747 . 1 12, 6 5,940. 2 
1975 1,529, ,5 21. , 4 950. 3 13 , 3 7,157. 1 
1976 1,866, ,2 17. ,8 1,173. 6 11, ,2 10,506. 8 
1977 2.653, , 1 21, ,9 1,374. 0 11, ,3 12,130. 5 
1978 2,886 , ,7 22. ,9 1,669. 7 13. , 3 12,597. 5 
1979 2,900. , 3 21, ,2 1,948. 0 14, ,2 2,556, .9 18 .6 13,711. 5 
1980 2.933, . 4 20, ,9 n. a. 3,023, , 7 21 .6 14,002. 2 
1981 3,252, , 1 20. ,7 n. a. 15,686. 0 
1982 3.682, , 1 19, , 5 n. a. 3,969, , 9 21 . 6 18,392. 2 
1983 3,982, ,7 20. ,5 n. a. 3,963, ,8 20 .4 19,449. 8 
1984 4,611, ,2 22. , 4 n. a. 4,539, ,9 22 . 0 20,625. 3 
SUMMARY OF GROWTH EPISODES (growth in deposits, % p. a. ) 
71-79 
79-84 
13 .9 
9.7 
34.8 
12.2 
20, 0 
8.5 
* The NBK uses a balance sheet date of June 30, while all other 
firms use December 31. For purposes of comparison, the deposits 
reported here are the linear interpolation of the deposits they 
report 6 months before and 6 months after the end of each year. 
Sources: Annual reports and Central 
"financial Review, various years. 
Bank of Kenya, 
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performance. Its deposits grew a bit faster than total CB 
deposits. On the other hand, the private Barclays grew almost 
half again as fast as total CB deposits. We do not have data on 
the CB deposits only for NBK during the latter period. 
It can be seen from Table 6 that the public sector firms 
were important in the early growth of the non-bank financial 
sector. KCB set the pace for this growth, with its market share 
growing from aero in 1971 to 32% in 1978. HFCK grew somewhat 
slower, but still contributed a large share of the absolute 
growth of the sector. In later years KCB turned its attention 
away from the non-bank sector almost entirely, with its non-bank 
deposits growing at only 6.1% p.a., way below the market growth 
rate of 26.6%. During this period however, HFCK held its own, 
turning in a growth rate from 1979-84 of 29.5% p.a. 
Deposit Growth--Summary and Conclusions 
In the first period under study, the high growth years of 
1971-79, the public sector firms' deposits grew at about the same 
rate as the market as a whole. The public sector growth was led 
by the newly started National Bank of Kenya, the NBFI subsidiary 
of the KCB (also newly started) and, to a lesser extent, by the 
HFCK. 
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TABLE 6 NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DEPOSITS 
KCB share NBK share HFCK share TOTAL 
1971 nil. 0, ,0 nil. 0.0 83. 3 18, ,8 442. 1 
1972 106. 2 18, 2 nil 109. 7 18 , 8 582.9 
1973 130. 2 19, 2 nil 128 . 2' 18, ,9 677,0 
1974 187. 8 23, 0 nil 144. 3 17 , 7 817.3 
1975 320. 2 25. ,5 nil 187 . 2 14, , 9 1,254.1 
1976 385. 7 27. ,0 nil 180. 9 12, , 7 1,429,6 
1977 643, 9 30. ,6 87. 6 4.2 213. 6 10, , 1 2,106,9 
1978 910, , 0 32, ,2 231. ,5 8.2 246. 8 8, ,7 2,828.0 
1979 1,133. , 0 30, , 3 nil 375. 7 10 . 1 3,733.2 
1980 1,284. ,3 26, , 5 n. a, 472. 6 9 .7 4,852.5 
1981 1,139, ,3 20, ,0 n. a, 688. 0 12 , 1 5,691.6 
1982 2,207, , 5 30 ,8 n. a, 886. 5 12 . 4 7,176.4 
1983 1, 367 ,7 15 ,8 n. a, 1: ,020. 7 11 . 8 8,671.9 
1984 1,526, .9 12, .6 n. a. 1,366. 3 11 .2 12,153.9 
SUMMARY OF GROWTH EPISODES (growth in % p. , a • ) 
71-79 30 .4* 20. 7 30.6 
79-84 6 . 1 29. 5 26.6 
* for 1972-79 
Sources: Annual reports and Central Bank of Kenya, Economic anc 
Financial Review, various years. 
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Under most models of oligopoly the presence of more firms 
leads to more competitive behavior, and this seems consistent 
with the evidence on the Kenyan financial industry. Up until 
1970 the banking sector was seen as lacking in dynamism and 
unresponsive to the needs of the public. Private sector firms 
were free to enter throughout the period under study (and many 
did so). The public sector firms were competing with private 
sector firms for deposits. Their success at attracting funds 
demonstrates that they were offering depositors better terms than 
was the private sector. 
There is one factor which might negate this interpretation 
of the deposit growth rates of the parastat.al banks. The state 
controls a significant portion of deposits in Kenya directly via 
the national government accounts and indirectly via local 
government and other parastatals. The proportion of deposits 
controlled by the government sector grew during the fast growth 
period. If government gave preference to putting government 
funds in government owned banks, that might explain deposit 
growth of parastatal banks. In that case we could not conclude 
that the parastatal banks had successfully competed for funds. 
The direct evidence which would permit us to test this 
explanation is not available: the data on what percentage of 
deposits in parastatal banks originate in the government sector 
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is not available. However, the importance of government deposits 
in explaining deposit growth of parastatal banks can be tested 
indirectly, econometricly. 
The model estimated was the following: 
Pardep = Ai • Deppub + As • Deppriv Eq. 1 
where Pardep = deposits in parastatal financial institutions 
Deppub = total deposits controlled by the national & 
local governments & other parastatals 
Deppriv = total deposits originating from the private 
sector 
In this model Ai can be interpreted as the portion of 
government deposits which it places in parastatal banks. 
Likewise, A2 is the portion of deposits which the private sector 
puts in parastatal banks. If Ai were 1 and A2 were 0 we could 
conclude that parastatal banks depended entirely on government 
deposits. 
The estimates for Equation 1 are shown in Table 7. Both 
coefficient estimates have the expected positive sign. The 
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation technique was used to 
correct for the presence of autocorrelation. 
The estimates reported in Table 7 allow us to reject the 
hypothesis that parastatal deposit growth was due solely to 
growth in government deposits. The coefficient on private 
\ • 
deposits (A2) is clearly non-sero, whereas that for public 
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TABLE 7 REGRESSION RESULTS 
Label Estimate St. error T-statistic 
Ai 0.14 0.26 0.53 
A 2 0.31 0.08 3.75 
degrees of freedom=12 R2= .98 
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deposits is not significantly different from sero. It can be 
concluded that the presence of the depository parastatals made 
the financial sector more competitive than it would have been in 
their absence. 
The public sector firms were especially important in the 
development of the NBFI sector. When KCB entered the market for 
NBFI funds the market was very small. It consisted of seven 
privately owned institutions plus the HFCK. Of the seven at 
least two were owned by and operated for the Asian community 
(Diamond Trust of Kenya Ltd, and Ismailia Corp L t d ) , is Several 
were specialised in mortgage lending. KCB immediately captured a 
large market share (18% in the first year of operations) which it 
could only have done by offering more competitive terms to 
depositors. They continued to perform better than the private 
sector, with an explosive 30.4% annual growth rate, compared with 
private sector NBFI growth of 23.5%. At the end of the fast 
growth period, in 1979, the public firms held 48.1% of the 
market, compared with 18.8% at the beginning of the period. 
Thus, to a large extent, the public sector led the way in the 
creation and development of the dynamic NBFI sector. 
It is perhaps paradoxical that it was the parastatals who 
pioneered in the development of the general purpose NBFIs. To 
the public the main attraction of NBFIs was the higher interest 
is Central Bank of Kenya, page 22 
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rate on deposits. Thus the development of NBFIs can be seen as a 
means of evading the interest rate restrictions imposed by 
government regulations. Their evasion permitted the growth of 
credit to local entrepreneurs who would not have qualified for 
loans from the commercial banks under the tighter interest rate 
restrictions applied to CBs. The success of KCB and NBK in 
operating these aggressive and dynamic NBFIs demonstrated the 
potential of this practically untapped market, in addition to 
providing the training ground for the personnel who would, tap it. 
As the attractiveness of the market became apparent, .many private 
competitors followed, including firms staffed by former employees 
of the parastatals. 
Finally, it might be noted that those parts of the public 
financial sector which were most dynamic during the high growth 
years of the 70s were very urban oriented. The commercial bank 
part of the KCB, with its extensive network of rural branches, 
grew only about. 2/3 as fast as total CB deposits. The dynamism 
came from the KCB's NBFI subsidiary, from the NBK and from the 
HFCK. All of these firms had all or most of their branches 
located in major urban areas, primarily Nairobi. Their growth 
did much to improve services in the urban areas and increase the 
competitiveness of the financial sector there. But little effort 
was devoted to extending financial services to the rural areas. 
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The public sector financial institutions apparently changed 
their strategy during the slow growth post-coffee boom period. 
Those parts of the public sector which primarily cater to the 
urban markets have exhibited the worst performance. The NBK, for 
example, grew at a dismal 3.4% p.a., a growth rate about one 
quarter of that of the total market and well below inflation. 
Likewise, the NBFI subsidiary of the KCB had deposit growth of 
only 6.1%, one fifth the rate of the NBFI sector as a whole, and 
also below inflation. Of public sector firms serving the urban 
markets, only the HFCK continued to perform on a par with the 
rest of the sector with which it competed. 
The commercial bank portion of the KCB, with its extensive 
rural branch network, has performed better than the urban 
oriented financial parastatals during the slow-growth period. It 
managed deposit growth which was somewhat faster than total 
growth in CB deposits. Although we don't have data which 
differentiates KCB bank deposits by branch of origin, we 
conjecture that this success stemmed in part from an aggressive 
expansion into rural areas. This expansion into the rura] areas 
will be discussed more below. 
One source of the decline in relative performance of 
parastatals following 1979 undoubtedly stems from the change in 
interest rate policies which occurred around then. As the policy 
switched from low nominal rates to higher ones, commercial banks 
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suffered a dramatic fall in growth of deposits relative to NBFI. 
Furthermore, as noted above, rumors abound of cut-throat 
competition among NBFI who offer non-interest cash payments to 
attract large depos itors. To the extent that the parastatals 
have refrained from these practices, which are of questionable 
legality, they have lost out relative to the private sector. 
This switch of deposits from CBs to NBFIs is probably an 
unintentional effect of the high interest rate policy. and calls 
into question the whole existence of interest rate ceilings on 
the CBs and especially differential policies between the two 
sectors. The NBFIs operate almost e n t i r e l y within the largest 
cities. Hence the draining of deposits from CBs toward NBFIs 
means that less credit is available to rural borrowers.10 
District. Focus and the Banking Sector 
Part of the success of the parastatal banks in attracting a 
larger share of deposits derives from Kenya Commercial Bank's 
aggressive branching strategy. At December 31, 1934, KCB had 52 
full branches compared to 46 for Barclays. In addition they had 
42 sub-branches, compared with 16 for Barclays and 127 mobile 
centers, compared with 7 for Barclays. Thus part of their growth 
came from serving markets not otherwise served, and not merely by 
competing for deposits within the cities. Paulson lists 143 
1 6
 Paulson, page 67. 
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locations which are served by only one bank. Of those 143 
locations, 130 are served by K C B .
1 7 
This aggressive branching strategy has continued and will 
continue. Since 1984 it has been a declared KCB goal to have at 
! 1 
least one full branch in every district,
1 8
 Considering that in 
September, 1984 only 27 of the 42 districts had full branches, 
this represents a considerable planned expansion. 
These extensive rural facilities represent a large 
investment in fixed assets. Since 1979 the value of these assets 
has expanded faster than the deposits they have attracted. In 
table 8 we compare the value of fixed assets to deposits. Fixed, 
assets were re-valued, so that the figure given for each year 
represents the replacement cost in that year. Whereas in 1978 
and 1979 each shilling of fixed assets supported Shs 33 of 
deposits, that dropped to 20 in 1980, where it has remained since 
then. 
2. Profitability 
Table 9 shows rates of return on equity in the financial 
sector. A brief glance at the table reveals that the sector has 
1 7
 Paulson, 1984, Appendix C. 
1 8
 Report of a speech by the Executive Chairman of Kenya 
Commercial Bank, Dr. Benjamin Kipkorir, reported in the Sunday 
Nation, Sept 9, 1984. 
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TABLE 8 KCB FIXED ASSETS VERSUS DEPOSITS 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
DEPOSITS 
(shs mil) 
886.7 
900 
933 
252. 1 
682 
3,982 
4,611 
FIXED ASSETS* 
(shs mil) 
87.0 
87.8 
144.4 
147.7 
163.4 
185.9 
229.0 
DEP/ASSETS 
33.2 
33 .0 
20.3 
22.0 
22.5 
21.4 
2 0 . 1 
* Replacement cost, current shillings. Calculated using category 
of asset and appropriate inflation indices. 
Source: Author's calculation from annual reports, various years. 
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been highly profitable for all the firms for which data is 
available, in almost every year. From a simple financial point 
of view, financial parastatals have been extremely good 
investments. A more detailed examination of table 9 reveals 
interesting details. 
First, note that throughout the period 1971-79 the NBR was 
less profitable than the KCB or HFCK. Out of 17 comparisons of 
NBK's profits with those of another firm, the NBK only surpasses 
one of the others 4 times. This is consistent with our view of 
the NBK as an aggressive entrant into a highly concentrated 
oligopolistic market. It probably spent more than KCB to attract 
depositors, since it had to attract a clientele to become 
established. 
Second, note that the HFCK has been more profitable than the 
commercial banks. Out of 27 comparisons, (12 with KCB, 13 with 
NBK and 2 with Barclays) the HFCK was higher in 20. This 
reflects the greater profitability of the NBFI sector. The 
profit rates reported for the KCB and NBK are based on the 
consolidated performance of the banks with their NBFI 
subsidiaries. Thus it is not surprising that all the instances 
in which the KCB and NBK surpassed the HFCK in p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
occurred in the earlier era during which their non-bank deposits 
were growing rapidly. In the later period, when KCB and NBK. seem 
to have virtually withdrawn from the competition for non-bank 
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deposits, they are always less profitable than the non-bank HFCK 
Third, the parastatal banks were less profitable in the 
later era. Before 1979 KCB's rate of return only once dipped 
below 30%, but after 1979 it only once achieved that rate. Since 
1979 the NBK has experienced two years of losses, the only losses 
reported by any firms in the sample. During the rest of the 
later period, in the four years in which the NBK reported 
profits, its performance was equivalent to its four worst years 
during the early period. On the other hand, the HFCK's profits 
improved a bit during the later period. Hence it seems that the 
worse profit performance of the NBK and KCB during the later 
period does not stem from worse market conditions generally. For 
the KCB at least, the drop in profitability is tied to its 
reorientation away from the urban, NBFI market, and towards the 
rural, commercial bank sector. Through its policy of opening 
facilities in unprofitable remote areas it has sacrificed about 
half its potential profits.
1 9 
The worsening of NBK' s profitability in the latter period 
has another cause which merits discussion. That is the matter of 
alleged embesslement. on the part, of the bank's Executive 
Chairman. In 1981 allegations were made in Parliament that the 
Chairman had stolen KShs 293 million from the bank during 1978 by 
is Int.ervxew with KCB staff. 
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TABLE 9 RATES OF RETURN ON EQUITY* <%) 
IMR BARCLAYS HFOK KCB NEK 
1971 69 . 1 17 .3 
1972 50. 5 32. 9 20.5 
1973 60. 3 9. 7 27 . 1 
1974 61. ,2 42. 8 29.9 
1975 106. , 2 37. 4 54.4 
1976 46 . ,2 47. 1 30.6 
1977 - 27 . ,2 62. 6 35.8 
1978 31, . 1 62. 0 38.4 
1979 52, .7 37. 9 -128.9 
1980 50. 8 38, .3 25. 8 28 .8 
1981 45 , 3 25. 1 25. C) 
1982 87 . 1 22. 3 15.8 
1983 67. .0 52 .6 32 . 4 21.6 
1984 55, ,4 28. 0 -3.5 
* Using average of equity at beginning and end of year. 
Source: Author's calculations from annual reports, various 
years. 
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taking out loans which would not be repaid. Documents were 
tabled showing the details of Shs 50 million of the alleged, 
stolen money. While no charges were ever filed related to the 
matter, annual reports in later years confirm that large bad 
loans were made. These loans have been written off from 1979 
clear up until 1984. By 1984 the total written off amounted to 
some Shs 250 m i l l i o n . 20 Table 10 shows that the bad loans 
written off were large relative to NBK's profits and go a long 
way toward explaining NBK's decline in profitability, Of course, 
there is no way of knowing what fraction of the bad loans were 
due to the alleged malfeasance; probably some were normal losses. 
We have 110 standard by which to estimate how high loan losses 
would normally be. The NBK didn't report writing off any loans 
prior to 1979. KCB and Barclays don't report their loan write-
offs. 
Finally, it should be noted that Barclays Bank, which is 
entirely private, has been much more profitable than KCB during 
the period 1979-84, with profit rates averaging 77% higher in 
each year. A large part of this difference must stem from KCB's 
2 0
 In fact the total written off exceeds that amount. The 
accounts of the NBK are consolidated with the Kenya National 
Capital Corporation, its NBFI subsidiary. However, NBK owns only 
60% of the Kenyac, the Kenya National Assurance Corporation 
owning the other 40%. Hence, of loans written off by Kenyac, 
only the NBK's share of the losses is reflected in the NBK 
accounts. Most of the 1984 writeoffs were Kenyac writeoffs. The 
breakdown is not available for previous years. 
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TABLE 10 EFFECT OF BAD LOANS ON NBK PROFITS 
(millions of shillings) 
Year Reported Profit Bad Loans Written Off 
1979 -89, ,4 152, ,8 
1980 21, ,7 22, ,8 
1981 29, ,7 5, .4 
1982 26, ,6 9, , 4 
1983 49, .9 19, .7 
1984 -8 .5 42, .9 
Source: Annual reports, various years. 
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policy of serving unprofitable rural markets, which will be 
discussed more below. It could also reflect differences in 
efficiency, but since neither RCB nor Barclays report their 
costs, this is impossible to assess. 
3. Returns' to Employees 
It is frequently alleged that parastatals run for the 
benefit of their employees at the expense of the other potential 
beneficiaries . This might happen through a firm hiring more 
employees than it needed, or by rewarding them more than needed 
to retain them. Such rewards could come in the form of high 
salaries, fringe benefits, on the job consumption, or through 
opportunities to divert company assets to personal use. All of 
these practices can exist at any level, be it manager or sweeper. 
All of these practices, where thy occur, will show up in a firm's 
accounts as an inflation of the firm's costs. Unfortunately it 
is difficult to evaluate whether costs are inflated by such 
practices, since we have no good standard by which to judge what 
costs should be. 
Table 11 shows available data on costs relative to loans 
outstanding. If no upward trend in this ratio exists, then at 
least there is no evidence that employees are increasingly 
exploiting their positions at the expense of other parties. 
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F. 
TABLE 11 COSTS (EXCLUDING INTEREST) AS A PERCENTAGE OF LOANS 
OUTSTANDING 
HFCK NBK NBK(excluding 
loan loss writeoffs) 
1971 3.0 
1972 2.5 
1973 2.9 
1974 2.2 
1975 1.9 
1976 1.9 4 .  1 4 . 1 
1977 2.4 3 . ,9 3 . 9 
1978 2.5 3. .8 3 . ,0 
1979 2.9 15 , .4 3. ,5 
1980 2.5 5 , . 1 3. ,6 
1981 2.3 4 .3 4, .0 
1982 15.8* 5 . 4 4, ,8 
1983 7 . 0* 5 . 4 4, .4 
1984 7 .7 5, . 1 
* Costs were arrived at indirectly in these years. They were 
defined as total income less profit and interest expense. It is 
possible that some change in accounting categories could explain 
the surprising jump. 
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The table shows the effect of the bad loans written off by 
the NBK in 1979 .and 1984, as mentioned above. The limited data 
available, for NBK and HFCK, suggest that aside from the problem 
with NBK management mentioned above, there was no upward trend on 
cost margins before 1982. There may be cause for concern since 
then. 
There is indirect evidence that, at least at managerial 
levels, employees are not being overpaid. Most of the 
mushrooming locally owned private sector financial institutions 
are staffed by former managers from KCB and NBK. The fact that 
these manager chose to leave proves that the parastatal sector is 
not over-compensating the value of their skills. 
D. Conclusions—Performance of Depository Parastatals 
The parastatal financial institutions have been used as 
effective tools of national development. The manner of their use 
differs before and since 1979 when the general government 
development strategy changed. 
Before 1979 the parastatal firms were used to foster 
economic, growth pure and simple. Private foreign capital was 
hesitant about economic prospects in Kenya following 
independence. Private local capital was not yet in a position to 
provide adequate investment and services. The parastatals filled 
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a vacuum then, providing financial services on terms that drew 
business away from private foreign firms and was highly 
profitable. By 1979 local financial markets were more developed 
and had more participants, including local entrepreneurs. 
Since 1979 the financial parastatals have competed less 
vigorously in urban markets which are well served by private 
firms. Major emphasis has instead been put on expanding services 
to rural markets not previously served. This re-orientation of 
the financial parastatals is consistent with the entire 
government policy since 1979, which has put. less emphasis on 
simple numerical growth and more on questions of regional 
distribution. This policy has been less profitable financially. 
The impression obtained from observing branches and interviewing 
staff is that it seems to have been carried out in an efficient 
and business-like way. 
II. THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCE CORPORATION 
The Agricultural Finance Corporation is a specialised non-
bank financial institution. It was established in 1963 for the 
purpose of providing loans to Africans who purchased farms from 
departing white settlers around independence. It was later (1966 
unofficially, 1969 officially) amalgamated with the Land and 
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Agriculture Bank, which had been the main source of agricultural 
loans to settlers before independence. 
/1 
In this paper we will first analyse the performance of the 
AFC as reflected in its audited accounts. However, there is 
serious reason to doubt the accuracy of these accounts. After 
examining them we will comment on probable sources of error and 
resulting bias in the results. 
A. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE--RETURNS TO SHAREHOLDERS 
The AFC was started as a small organization, with only 25 
employee s. By 1966 the combined AFC and Land Bank had 147 
employees, including 17 expatriates. It had 9 branch offices and 
7 sub-branches. In 1983 the AFC had 37 branch offices and over 
500 employees. 
Unlike the financial institutions discussed in the previous 
section, the AFC does not accept deposits from the public. The 
capital which the AFC lends comes from grants and loans, as well 
as the accumulated general reserve. Much of the capital is 
obtained from soft loans from international agencies such as the 
World Bank and USAID, which is on-lent by the government to AFC, 
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Certain aspects o f t h e f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e AFC are 
shown in Table 12. T h e A F C w a s s t a r t e d i n 1 9 6 4 w i t h a small 
equity base of Shs 7.8 m i l l i o n , w h i c h w a s t h e n e r o d e d away due to 
losses leaving only S h s 1 . 4 m i l l i o n o f e q u i t y b y 1 9 6 9 . During 
this early period the A F C w a s r e c e i v i n g n e w i n f u s i o n s of capital 
in the form of loans. T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f e r o d i n g e q u i t y and 
growing net assets m e a n s t h a t t h e r a t i o of e q u i t y t o net assets 
fell from 15.7% in 1964 t o 1 . 7 % b y 1 9 6 9 . 
S 
During 1970 large c a p i t a l t r a n s f u s i o n s w e r e r e c e i v e d . 
Equity jumped f i f t y - f o l d , w h i l e n e t t o t a l a s s e t s m o r e than 
doubled, giving the AFC a m u c h m o r e f a v o r a b l e e q u i t y to net 
assets ratio of 25.7%. F o l l o w i n g t h i s t r a n s f u s i o n p e r f o r m a n c e 
continued to be l a c k l u s t e r . E q u i t y s t a g n a t e d in n o m i n a l terms 
from 1970 to 1976, d u r i n g w h i c h t i m e p r i c e l e v e l s r o s e by 87%. 
Even this overstates t h e h e a l t h o f t h e A F C . E q u i t y l e v e l s were 
only maintained by an I n f l o w o f i n t e r e s t f r e e g r a n t s which 
balanced the declining g e n e r a l r e s e r v e s a s t h e A F C c o n t i n u e d to 
earn losses. 
From 1976-83 the A F C r e c o r d s a h e a l t h i e r p e r f o r m a n c e . 
Equity grew at 13% p. a. w h i l e i n f l a t i o n a v e r a g e d 9 % p . a. While 
total equity slightly m o r e t h a n d o u b l e d , g e n e r a l r e s e r v e s grew by 
an order of magnitude, t h e f i r s t s e l f - f i n a n c e d g r o w t h the AFC 
ever recorded. During t h i s p e r i o d n e t t o t a l a s s e t s a l s o slightly 
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TABLE 12 FINANCIAL STRUCTURE~0F AFC 
YEAR EQUITY NET TOTAL ASSETS EQ./NET ASSETS CURRENT LIAB. 
(mil Shs) (mil Shs) (%) /TOTAL ASSETS(35) 
1964 7 , .8 49 , , 7 15, ,7 1. ,5 
1965 7 .8 55, ,7 •r< 14 ; 0 . 0. ,6 
1966 6 .0 65. ,3 9. ,3 . 7, ,9 
1967 4, .9 67 . , li 7, ,4 • ' .7, .4 
1968 
1969 1, .4 82. ,8 1. ,7 3, , 5 
1970 51, .0 198 , , 7 25, ,1 . 8, 0 
1971 50, .4 211, ,3 23, ,9 9, , 0 
1972 49, ,9 227 , ,7 21, Q 6. ,0 
1973 50., 4 25.5. ,3 19. ,7 .4, 4 
1974 52 , .8 283, , 7 18, ,6 3, ,5 
1975 49 , ,8 3.29. ,2 15, ,1 ... .-3, ,5
1976 51, , 1 414, , 1 12, ,3 2. ,8 
1977 . '59, 0 ,i 492. , 0 • • 12, 0 2 ,6 
1978 70, ,4 524. ,7 13, ,4 2 ,5 
1979 83. ,5 , 625. ,9 13, ,3 9 : • • t-, . .7 
1980 100. 5 705 . ,2 14, ,3 7, ,8 
1981 109. , 4 767 . ,8 14, ,2 20 ,2 
1982 112. , 8 821. , 7 13, ,7 ' 19, ,1 
1983 120. 2 829 , .8 14, 23. ,4 
Source: AFC Annual Reports, various years. 
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more than doubled, due to continuing infusions of loan capital. 
Since 1980 there has been an alarming increase in current 
liabilities. Current liabilities as a share of total assets 
hovered in the range or 2-5% from 1973 to 1979. Then they began 
a rapid climb and in 1983 they were 23.4%, an astonishing ratio 
for an organisation whose business is long term lending. 
Table 13 provides data on the interest rate structure of 
AFC. Column 1 shows interest payable by AFC as a percentage of 
its interest bearing debt. These interest rates were low 
throughout the period. Especially in the late 70s and early 80s 
when interest rates elsewhere were so high, the rates the AFC was 
charged on its debt were highly concessionary. 
Column 2 shows the interest receivable by AFC as a 
percentage of total loans outstanding. These figures can be 
contrasted with those in column 3, the maximum loan rate charged 
by commercial banks. AFC loan rates were consistently lower than 
rates charged by commercial banks, which were in turn lower than 
those charged by non-bank financial institutions. 
A comparison of columns 1 and 2 shows that the degree to 
which AFC passed on its own interest rate subsidy to its clients 
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TABLE 13 AVERAGE INTEREST RATES AND RATES OF RETURN 
Int payable Int receivable CB Loan ROI ROE 
as % of debt as % of loans rate (max) 
1965 3.1 8 . 4 • 2 .5 0, .0 
1966 3.4 6 .3 0, .1 -3, ,4 
1967 3.8 5 .8 1, ,8 -2, ,0 
1968 
1969 1.3 8 , 1 -2, ,1 -7, ,2 
1970 6.5 9 . 3 4, , 1 -3. ,6 
1971 5'. 1 6 . 3 3, ,3 _ 9 , 1 
1972 5.0 7 . 1 3, ,5 "I , n \J 
1973 4.8 7 . 4 3. ,6 "I, , 0 
1974 4.6 7 .3 4, ,.1 2. 2 
1975 4.3 7 .5 9 {j « .5 -6, ,4 
1976 3.9 7 .7 9. .0" 3, .5 0, 0 , V 
1977 3.8 8 .9 10. .0 5 .1 14. ,5 
1978 3.6 8 . 1 10. ,0 5 .4 17, ,3 
1979 3.4 8 .9 10, ,0 E U • .0 15, r. 
1980 3.4 9 .2 11 . ,0 5. .5 18, ,9 
1981 3.2 9 . 1 14. ,0 5. .6 19. ,3 
1982 3.4 11 . 0 16. ,0 6. . 1 22, ,7 
1983 3.7 11 . 0 15. .0 5, .9 19, ,3 
Source: AFC Annual Reports, various years. 
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decreased markedly. During the periods 1965-67 and 1981-83 AFC's 
average interest rate on debt was the same, 3.4%. During the 
former period the average interest rate AFC charged its clients 
was 6.8%, while during the latter period its interest rate 
charges averaged 10.4%. 
Column 4 shows the rate of return on investment in AFC. 
This is pre-tax profit plus interest payable as a percentage of 
total net assets. The AFC earned a small positive ROI every year 
but one. That such returns are inadequate can be seen by 
comparing column 4 with columns 1 and 5. The returns on total 
investment reported in column 4 are less than the average 
interest rate on AFC debt in column 1 every year until 1977, 
which explains the string of negative returns on equity (pre-tax 
profit over equity) reported for the first decade of A F C s 
existence. Even if government never intended to turn a profit 
from loaning money for agriculture, the financial performance of 
the AFC in its first decade was so poor that the capital base was 
being eroded away. The AFC was not even self-sustaining, let 
alone profit making, 
Since 1977 the profit, performance of AFC has improved. Over 
the period 1977-33 AFC reported an average P.OI of 5.5%, more than 
double the average reported during the 1965-76 period of 2.4%. 
While AFC's ROI in the post 1977 period cannot be considered 
high, it at least surpassed the cost of borrowed funds, so that 
returns on equity have been positive, mostly in the range of 15-
20% for the whole period 1977-33. A large part of the 
explanation for AFC's improved profitability lies in the 
reduction of interest rate subsidy to AFC borrowers, as seen from 
comparing columns one and two. 
The increase in interest rates AFC charges on its loans and 
the resulting improvement in financial performance does not 
reflect a decision that AFC must rely on internally generated 
funds. Table 14 shows sources of capital for the AFC. It will 
be noted that AFC has continued to receive large infusions in the 
form of loans as well as small infusions in the form of grants, 
Paulson noted that since 1976/77 appropriations from the budgets 
of the ministries of Agriculture and Livestock Development to AFC 
fell as a percentage of the total development budgets for those 
ministries. 21 Table 14 shows that the transfers to AFC after 
1977 were large relative to previous transfers. The reported 
improvement in AFC's financial performance seems to reflect one 
aspect of a commitment to maintaining AFC operations, not a 
cutting off of AFC from its access to soft funds. 
2 1 Paulson, p. 118. 
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B. EFFICIENCY AND RETURNS TO AFC EMPLOYEES 
• • i 
Table 15 shows AFC costs as a percentage of AFC's portfolio 
of loans to farmers. These costs include Board members' fees and 
allowances, staff costs, general administration and depreciation. 
They do not include provisions for bad debts, nor the opportunity 
cost of low cost loans made to staff. The level of such loans 
outstanding is shown in Table 16, No information is available on 
interest charged on loans to staff. Table 15 shows no particular 
trend in cost levels. The figures for 1982 and 1983 are higher 
than average and could represent the beginning of an adverse 
trend, but costs have been higher before and come back down. 
The AFC could have hidden excessive returns to AFC staff by 
giving them in the form of loans rather than salary. But the 
data presented in Table 16 make this seem unlikely. There is a 
surprising lack of upward trend in loans to staff, considering 
that the number of employees grew and the value, of the shilling 
declined steadily. Even the value in 1983, which looks like a 
big increase, represents less in real terms than the staff loans 
in the early 1970s. As a percentage of loans to farmers, the 
staff loans have not risen. Most of the provisions for bad debts 
are applied against loans to farmers. Hence there is no evidence 
th&t the AFC could be making loans to its staff which it then 
writes off. . 
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TABLE 14 TRANSFUSIONS OF NEW CAPITAL TO AFC ('000 Shs) 
Retained. earnings New grants New debt Total 
1965 -18 1 — 6,000 0 5 931.9 
1966 -1,763 2 - 11,390 6 9 627.4 
1967 -1,101 1 - 2,874 5 1 773, 3 
1968 
1969 -3,508 1 - 19,246 0 15 246.0 
1970 -1,683 6 51, 213 7 66,328 8 115 859.0 
1971 . -1,087 4 549 6 13,200 4 12 662.6 
1972 -673 6 166 0 16,838 2 16 330.6 
1973 -481 6 996 0 27,587 9 28 102,3 
1974 1, 127 9 1, 257 5 26,764 8 27 892.7 
1975 -3,261 7 300 0 48,535 0 45 573.4 
1976 392 4 874 9 83,637 5 84 904.8 
1977 7,961 4 -44 9 69,906 2 77 822.8 
1978 11,181 7 140 0 21,464 9 Cj 32 785.8 
1979 11,668 1 1, 480 4 87,962 1 101 110.6 
1980 17,397 9 402 6 62,356 3 79 351,6 
1981 7,810 5 1, 051 4 53,738 9 £ 6 2 6 0 0 . 2 
1982 2,465 5 996 2 50,417 2 53 873.8 
1983 6,939 6 477 8 669 0 8 086. 4 
Sourcei AEC-Annual Reports, various years 
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TABLE 15 ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF AFC AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF LOANS TO FARMERS OUTSTANDING 
1965 7 . 4% 1975 5. 2% 
1966 5.6 1976 4.6 
1967 5.6 1977 4.5 
1968 8.1 1978 4.5 
1969 1979 4.9 
1970 3.5 1980 4.4 
1971 3.2 1981 5.1 
1972 3.9 1982 6.2 
1973 4.3 1983 7.4 
1974 4.5 
Source: AFC Annual Reports, various years." 
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TABLE 16 LOANS TO AFC STAFF OUT STANDING 
Shs.
 r
000 
1964 70, ,9 1974 360, .6 
1965 155 ,7 1975 449, .3 
1966 372, , 8 1976 426, ,0 
1967 341. ,2 1977 466, , 8 
1968 1978 545, .5 
1969 542. ,8 1979 461, ,5 
1970 795, ,5 1980 624. , 1 
1971 778, ,5 1981 475 , 
1972 716. 2 1982 918, ,9 
1973 466, 7 1983 1,512. ,1 
Source: AFC Annual Reports, various years. 
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To summarize, the data reported by the AFC give no reason to 
believe that AFC staff are increasingly exploiting their position 
and capturing increasing returns. There is no evidence that 
total staff costs have increased disproportionately, nor 
expenditure on fixed assets which would include staff housing, 
nor loans to staff. Comparison of data from Table 15 with that 
from Table 11 above shows that the AFC's costs as a percentage of 
loans have been in approximately the same range as those for the 
National Bank of Kenya. This may be an indication of 
inefficiency given that NBK gets its funds in a fairly 
competitive financial market. Its administrative costs include 
the costs of dealing with thousands of depositors, while AFC gets 
its funds in a few large transactions. Furthermore, the average 
size of AFC loans is higher, which should reduce its cost margins 
below those of the commercial banks. ' 
C. CHARACTERISTIC,S Of AFC LOANS--RETURNS TO BORROWERS 
In addition to loaning to Kenyans who took over large farms 
the AFC is supposed to loan to several groups who would not 
qualify for loans from commercial banks. These target groups 
include group ranches, borrowers without land titles, 
smallholders, and medium scale commercial farmers. AFC has acted 
as agent for the government in administering seasonal credit for 
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large farmers. 
Data on the size, purpose and number of new loans approved 
each year is summarized in Table 17. The number of loans granted 
is small and the average size is large. The wide fluctuation in 
average loan size probably reflects the presence in some years 
ofa few very large loans. Up through 1976 over half the loans 
approved each year were for land purchase. In other words, most 
of the AFC's capital was tied up in a few large loans at 
subsidized interest rates for a transfer of assets which could 
not be expected to result in increased agricultural production, 
Paulson examined detailed loan data on a sample of loans 
given by 5 rural branches of the AFC between 1980 and 1982 and 
compared it with loans from a commercial bank in the same 
districts and in the same period. She found that AFC loans were 
larger on average and that they went, to persons with higher 
incomes. This information is given in Table 18. 
Despite the fact that the AFC lends to such a wealthy 
clientele, it suffers a high rate of default on its loans. The 
amount of principle and interest in arrears as a percentage of 
the outstanding portfolio increased s t e a d i l y from 12.7% in 1975 
to 25.0% in 1982. Particulars are given in Table 19. In the 
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TABLE 17 NEW LOANS APPROVED 
number Total amount average loan average loan % of loans 
(mil , 3hs) (Shs) (1976 Shs) for land 
purchase 
1964 546 17 .9 32,812 66,963 n. a . 
1965 579 19 .2 33,202 68,037 n. a. 
1966 432 10 . 1 23,443 47,263 n. a. 
1967 258 5 .9 22,911 45,190 n. a. 
1968 
1969 388 9 0 • CJ 23,744 45,574 77.8* 
1970 262 25 . 2 96,020 179,477 75.3* 
1971 437 32 .9 75,254 134,142 66.3 
1972 233 42 . 1 180,600 299,006 63.2 
1973 111 8 .9 79,996 121,206 7 . 5 
1974 129 40 .4 313,327 402,218 67 .8 
1975 198 63 .5 320,645 372,843 72.4 
1976 209 52 .9 252,951 252,951 87.3 
1977 335 43 .9 131,122 111, 120 43.8 
1978 628 82 .7 131,766 108,094 35.0 
1979 734 121 .4 165,329 129,063 29.7 
1980 816 110 .7 135,658 96,554 20.6 
1981 548 131 .5 240,051 155,172 41.6 
1982** 3,595 98 .8 27,491 16,152 13.2 
1983** 5,445 260 .5 47,849 26,176 10.9 
* overestimate, includes loans for "various" purposes not 
otherwise specified. 
** includes seasonal crop and smallholder credit, which is 
excluded in other years. 
Source: Statistical Abstract, various years. 
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sample of loans Paulson examined, of those loans on which some 
payment was due, 68% were in arrears. More than half of those in 
arrears were over a year in arrears. The maximum arrears on one 
account was over Shs 2.5 m i l .
2 2
 Large loans were more likely to 
i>e in arrears than small loans.
 2
3 
The arrears position of the AFC is so serious as to endanger 
Its viability as a source of credit. The AFC has had to impose 
Lending embargoes several times in the last few years due to 
Liquidity problems. In the period 1979-82 new lending was under 
V+. 1 « 1 o r "hri+.ftl p m b s r c o rlnri n c 9F> mr>n+.hs 24 
Several factors contribute to the serious arrears situation 
lFC faces. First AFC's accounting system is faulty. Second, 
l F C ' s loan collection procedures are lax. Third, AFC loan 
:ollection has become a politically sensitive issue. 
Paulson found that AFC's accounting system is so cumbersome 
m d slow as to distort the classification of which accounts are 
.n arrears. "The AFC accounting department is centralised in 
lairobi...The head accounting office is notorious for ignoring 
•equests from the branches to correct accounts which show arrears 
22 Paulson, 1984, pages 130-133. 
2 3 Paulson, 1984, page 155. 
24 Paulson, 1984. page 123. 
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TABLE 18 CHARACTERISTICS OF LOANS & BORROWERS 
Group Means AFC BANKS 
Sample (213) (139) 
Average Loan Size (Shs) 56,025 •' 38,279 
Smallest Loan 4,000 1,000 
Largest loan 1,080,000 480,000 
Period of Loan (months) 66,7 29.4 
Farm Income (Shs) 29,395 15,975 
Non-Farm Income (Shs) 41,021 28,200 
Percent that did not report 
a Non-Farm Income 27 37 
Average Land Ownership (acres) 107 42 
Average Value of Land and 
Permanent Improvements (Shs) 148,298 52,951 
Source: Paulson, 1984, pages 173, 176, 180 and 181 
60 IDS./WF 449 
TABLE 19 TOTAL ARREARS ON AFC PORTFOLIO 
(Year ending March 31, K Shs. mil.) 
Principal and Interest 
in Arrears and Interest 
on Arrears 
Portfolio 
Outstanding 
Arrears•as 
Percent of 
Outstanding 
1975 40. ,76 321 • ,7 12. ,7 
1976 55, ,96 413, , 1 13, ,5 
1977 76 , ,26 457, ,6 16, ,7 
1978 74, ,60 502, , 1 14, ,9 
1979 90, ,84 594, ,3 15, .3 
1980 135, ,80 719, ,6 18, , 9 
1981 164, ,75 731. ,9 22, ,5 
1982 871, ,6 25, ,0 
Source: Paulson, 1984, p. 126. 
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even after payment has been received... Because of the accounting 
problems in the Corporation, the information on timing, of 
repayment i s faulty..."25 
When AFC borrowers fall into arrears, the Corporation is lax 
in its collection procedures. Paulson examined the record of 
collection efforts made in 262 loans in arrears for over 6 
months. She reported that "Of the loans with arrears, about one-
third have no record of loan servicing. A further 23% have only 
a notice from AFC...It is impossible to know what percentage of 
these notices ever reached the clients since, as Marende pointed, 
out, most small borrowers have no personal postal address. Only 
35% of the clients with arrears have had their farms inspected, 
12% have received foreclosure notices and only 2% have had the 
farm a d v e r t i s e d . " 2 e With such lax collection efforts it is 
hardly surprising that many clients allow their accounts to fall 
into arrears. Furthermore, having one's account, in arrears is no . 
impediment to repeat borrowing from A F C . 2 7 
Collection efforts by the AFC are hindered by the political 
process. The granting of loans by AFC in the first place is a 
political process. This is clearly true in the case of those 
target groups who could not qualify for commercial credit. 
2 5 Paulson, 1984, p. 136. . 
29 Paulson, 1984, page 157. 
27 Paulson, 1984, page 160. 
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Paulson reports that AFC loan officers are also under heavy-
pressure to give favorable treatment to clients "introduced" by 
politicians. While the commercial banks also complain of such 
pressures, the A F C reported it more f r e q u e n t l y . 2 8 
It is difficult for.AFC to pressure either the targeted 
clientele of the AFC or the politically well-connected for 
repayment. Seizure of land from the specially targeted groups is 
seen as harassing wananchi and if done on a broad scale would 
generate substantial protest, protest the government would be 
unlikely to ignore. 
Regarding the latter group, "...officers in AFC refer to 
some large borrowers as the "untouchables" because of their 
political connections."29 Leys noted that 
"In an important minority of cases, the [AFC] debtors were 
influential supporters of the government, so that the 
ultimate weapon of eviction was generally less likely to be 
used. On the other hand, its selective use, against 
prominent people who were in official disfavour, or against 
a limited number of "small men" on the settlement schemes 
who had no currently influential political protector, could 
serve a double purpose of strengthening the power of the 
regime over would-be critics or rivals, and at the same time 
of appeasing the credit institutions and their foreign 
creditors, on which the regime also depended. The 
parliamentary "sifting committee" which authorized the 
eviction of seventy six settlers down to 1969 exemplified 
this balance of considerations at one end of the scale. The 
threatened foreclosure in 1972 of a small number of 
2 8 
2 9 
Paulson, 1984, pages 108-109. 
Paulson, 1984, page 133. 
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prominent large-farm defaulters, who had in various ways 
recently dropped from favour, illustrated it at the other 
end."so 
There are probably at least three factors at work which 
explain why AFC has been so much more susceptible to political 
pressures than have the other financial parastatals. First is. 
the fact that AFC has administered the seasonal crop credit 
schemes. Second is the fact that AFC has offered loans on 
concessionary terms. Third is the fact that AFC has no 
depositors. 
The seasonal crop credit schemes in Kenya have been combined 
with a kind of crop insurance. The seasonal crop credit schemes 
have gone through several incarnations, beginning as the Medium 
Return Scheme (1942-67), then the Guaranteed Minimum Returns 
(1967-79), and, most recently, the New Seasonal Crop Credit 
Scheme (NSCCS, 1980-present) •. 
"The basic characteristics of the seasonal credit 
programs have been similar for the various generations. The 
government sets the amount of credit available per acre, the 
minimum farm size eligible to participate in the program and 
the crops to be funded. The credit allotment usually covers 
about two-thirds of the estimated cost of production... 
Responsibility for loan appraisal is shared by the Ministry 
of Agriculture extension staff and the credit agency."3i 
Before 1980 the debts were cancelled in the event of weather 
related crop failure. This form of crop insurance was subject to 
30 Leys, 1975, page 102. 
3 1 Paulson, 1984, page 114. 
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.h mo^al hazard problem and was used and abused to avoid 
repayment. It was formally dropped in 1980, which was expected 
to improve repayment rates. However, those who still owed money 
under the previous program were allowed to continue borrowing, 
and government has chosen not to take court action against 
defaulters.
3
 2 
"AFC has argued that being forced to administer the, 
seasonal credit program on an agency basis has weakened the 
institution by allowing credit discipline to decline and not 
giving AFC the authority to collect.. .Because of the 
accounting errors and administrative problems of the 
seasonal credit scheme, clients have become accustomed to 
being in arrears..."33 
We have seen that the terms on AFC loans have been softer 
than the terms on commercial bank loans. Interest rates have 
been lower and repayment periods longer. Hence, the AFC is a 
more attractive target for political pressure than are the 
commercial banks, and may have served to deflect pressure from 
them, If AFC continues to raise its lending rates toward 
commercial levels, and if it were to collect on its debts 
effectively, it may be that the banks would bear a larger share 
of pressure from politicians. 
Finally, the fact that AFC has no depositors almost 
certainly makes it more susceptible to political pressure than 
are the other financial parastatals. If RGB, NBK, or HFCK 
32 Paulson, 1984, page 114. 
3 3 Paulson, 1984, page 115. 
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suffered arrears anything like those of the AFC, they would 
quickly become unable to meet depositors' withdrawals. This 
would cause a_ public furor at least comparable to that which 
comes when the AFC tries to press for repayment. On the other 
hand, when AFC loses money due to arrears, those who are hurt are 
those who would have gotten loans if there were no lending 
embargoes, or the exchequer in general. Neither group is likely 
to complain vocally. 
The AFC's failure cannot be excused by its specialised role 
of lending to agriculture. Within that sector it has lent mostly 
to an elite clientele. Meanwhile, the supposedly more profit 
oriented depository financial institutions have expanded their 
operations in the agricultural sector, partially filling the void 
left by the failure of the AFC. Table 20 shows that while in 
1974 some 59% of agricultural lending came from the banks and 
NBFIs, by 1933 their share had risen to 82%. 
D . A F C A C C O U N T I N G P R O B L E M S 
The AFC has failed to make adequate provisions for bad 
loans. As reported above, by 1982 arrears amounted to 25% of the 
total value of loans outstanding. Yet provisions against bad 
loans were only 8.4% of outstanding loans to farmers. It seems 
probable that this is an urider-provision. Furthermore, the AFC 
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reports interest income when it accrues, rather than when it is 
received, The result of these problems with the accounts is thar 
the picture presented here has been biased. In fact the actual 
financial performance has probably been significantly worse than 
that reported. The returns to consumers, on the other hand, have 
been better. 
E. SUMMARY 0E AFC PERFORMANCE 
The AFC has been a highly politicised parastatal. It has 
never functioned on commercial lines, either on the supplier side 
or on the consumer side. It has been supported by a supply of 
soft credit and has never competed with other financial 
institutions for supplies of capital. It has loaned on 
concessionary terms, at low interest rates and for long terms, 
and the choice of who receives those loans has been politicised. 
Its greatest departure from commercial practice is its failure to 
/ i I. 
collect on its loans. The repayment, performance has been so poor 
as to endanger its ability to .continue operations. 
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TABLE 20 AGRICULTURAL CREDIT OUTSTANDING 
(K. Shs. m. at end of March) 
Years Commercial 
Banks 
Cooperative NBFI AFC 
Bank 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1,186.6 
1,459.2 
1,528.2 
1,705.6 
1,885.1 
2,622.0 
319.5 
374.0 
684.1 
879.1 
65.3 65.1 321.7 
97.9 71.3 413.1 
77.3 92,9 457.6 
156.2 109.3 502.1 
255.8 99.9 594.3 
308.2 130.8 719.7 
446.] 175.0 608.1 
374.2 562.8 886.8 
422.5 841.5 852.0 
60.4 263.2 
* excludes the Cooperative Bank except in 1974 when the 
Cooperative Bank was included 
** statistics for NBFI include private-sector credit only 
**# not audited 
Note: AFC credit does not include the government seasonal crop 
credit programs 
Source: Paulson, page 23. '' 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
We have examined the performance of four financial 
parastatals. .The first three are depository institutions. The 
performance of these institutions during the 1970s was excellent. 
They were highly profitable and competed successfully with the 
private sector. They helped to expand the financial sector and 
cause it to behave more like a competitive market and less like a 
tight oligopoly. 
During the period from 1979-84 the behavior of the 
parastatal commercial banks changed. Emphasis has shifted from 
urban markets to rural ones. Kenya Commercial Bank has embarked 
on a policy of aggressive branching in rural areas. This policy 
has been costly in terms of foregone profits, but appears to have 
been accomplished without sacrificing efficiency or changing from 
commercial criteria for loans to political ones. 
Several dangers to the sector were identified. Key among 
these was political pressure to make bad loans. The depository 
institutions appear to have been successful at resisting pressure 
to make unsound loans to politically well connected individuals. 
They have been less successful at resisting pressure to loan to 
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bankrupt parastatals. To date the situation seems manageable, 
but if the situation were to worsen it could ruin the 
effectiveness of the banks. 
The potential for trouble due to politicised loans was 
illustrated by the case of the Agricultural Finance Corporation. 
This firm was shown to be unprofitable and inefficient. Its loan 
procedures are politicised and its collection procedures even 
more so. These problems are so severe that the Corporation is 
not self-sufficient. Though it has continued to receive large 
transfusions of new capital on soft terms, the AFC is so 
ineffective at debt collection that it has repeatedly run out of 
i 
funds and been forced to suspend new lending. 
The AFC can only be seen as a mechanism to transfer 
resources from the exchequer to the AFC's clientele. This 
clientele is, on the average, far wealthier than that of the 
commercial banks. In contrast to the positive performance of the 
depository institutions, the AFC seems to have contributed littU 
to national development. Its chronic squandering of funds and 
failure to mobilise finance for agriculture calls into question 
the use of soft funds and non-commercial criteria to allocate 
resources which are supposed to be invested in private sector, 
commercially viable agricultural enterprises. 
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